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Abstract Using a contemporary national sample of married couples (N = 1368 couples) and a dyadic path analysis,
the authors examined whether commitment and relationship maintenance behaviors facilitate marital quality resilience for wives and husbands reporting recession-related
financial stressors and economic pressure. Relationship
maintenance behaviors moderated the association between
economic pressure and marital quality for wives. Wives
reported higher levels of marital satisfaction and lower levels of divorce proneness during economic pressure when
husbands reported higher levels of relationship maintenance
behaviors. Unexpectedly, wives reported higher levels of
divorce proneness during economic pressure when husbands
reported higher levels of marital commitment.
Keywords Commitment · Economic well-being · Marital
quality · Relationship maintenance behaviors

Introduction
Researchers have linked negative economic stressors, and
the feelings of economic pressure that they engender, to
lower levels of marital quality (Conger et al. 1994). Furthermore, financial issues are among the most common issues
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over which couples fight (Papp et al. 2009; Stanley et al.
2002), and financial conflict evidences a stronger association with disrupted marital quality than conflict over other
relationship issues (Dew et al. 2012; Papp et al. 2009). Given
the association of economic stressors, feelings of economic
pressure, and decreased marital quality (Conger et al. 1994),
identifying protective factors that can help couples during
economic pressure is important.
Unfortunately, few researchers have examined protective
factors that can help couples maintain marital quality while
experiencing economic stressors. We are aware of only four
such studies. Results from these studies showed that problem solving skills (Conger et al. 1999), religious marital
sanctification (Ellison et al. 2011), financial satisfaction
(Archuleta et al. 2011), and a stable personality (Liker and
Elder 1983) were associated with marital resilience during
economic problems.
These four studies are foundational, but additional
research is needed. That researchers have catalogued only
four marital protective factors in the context of economic
problems seems somewhat limited, given that many couples face such problems. Identifying additional factors that
could help couples maintain their relationships when they
experience feelings of economic pressure would benefit couples, researchers, and practitioners. Further, the four studies mentioned above used data that predate the 2007–2009
Recession, and given the salience of that period as it relates
to couple economic wellbeing, using data collected after the
Recession to carry out such an investigation would make
a significant contribution to this body of literature. PostRecession data would be valuable in this context given that
the Recession brought about both employment-related problems (like most past recessions have) and the unique stressor
of housing-related problems. These data are situated within
the aftermath of the 2007–2009 Recession, so as such, this
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study may give additional insight into how couples, on a
micro-level, handle macro-economic downturns. Additionally, each of the four previous studies relied on data that had
been collected in a single state. Finally, some of the studies
used only individual data rather than dyadic data. This is
problematic because spousal attitudes and behaviors might
be as much a protective factor during stress as one’s own
attitudes and behaviors.
The current study fills some of these gaps. First, we
examined new potential protective factors (i.e., marital
commitment and relationship maintenance behaviors) that
might facilitate more stable marital quality during economic
pressure. Second, we used a recent (2010–2011), nationally
representative sample of married couples (N = 1,368) to test
our hypotheses. Third, because our data were dyadic, we
could examine both the associations between participants’
own reports and their marital quality (i.e., actor effects) and
the associations between spouses’ reports and participants’
outcomes (i.e., partner effects; Kenny et al. 2006).
Economic Stressors, Economic Pressure, and Marital
Resilience
Fundamentally, this is a study of marital resilience. Resilience is manifested in the presence of positive family outcomes or absence of negative family outcomes despite the
presence of risk (Patterson 2002). Thus, marital resilience
is apparent when, as a result of moderating or protective
factors, reports of marital quality improve, remain stable,
or more slowly deteriorate for some than for others during
difficult conditions.
We combine two frameworks—the Family Stress Model
of Economic Pressure and Marital Distress, or simply
Family Stress Model (Conger et al. 1994), and the Family Adjustment and Adaptation Response (FAAR) model
(Patterson 2002)—to generate our hypotheses. The Family
Stress Model explains the interface of financial stressors and
marital quality. The FAAR model is suited for examinations
of family resilience (Patterson 2002).
The Family Stress Model
The Family Stress Model explains a process that leads from
financial stressors to decreased marital quality. It begins
with financial stressors such as job loss, low income, or
other types of financial difficulties. These financial stressors
begin to create feelings of economic pressure (Conger et al.
1994). Economic pressure is the perception that the family is
struggling to meet material needs, and the stressful feelings
that accompany this perception (e.g., Conger et al. 1994).
In other words, easily quantifiable variables such as job
loss, housing problems, or low income are objective financial stressors, whereas economic pressure represents the
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subjective perception and affective response to such stressors. When feelings of economic pressure exist, the Family
Stress Model indicates that they lead to other types of negative affect such as anxiety, depression, and hostility (Conger
et al. 1994). Finally, the model posits that these negative
affective states are associated with decreased marital quality.
The 2007–2009 Recession created financial stressors
for many American families. Over 8 million workers lost
their jobs during the recession and the 6 months following it (Goodman and Mance 2011). These job losses hit
most sectors of the economy, and the lengths of time that
individuals spent unemployed were much greater, on average, than people experienced during previous recessions.
Somewhat uniquely, many families also experienced housing problems. When the combination of the housing-value
bubble and subprime mortgage lending expansion was no
longer sustainable, many families either experienced stress
because of their housing or lost their housing altogether.
Banks began an estimated 8.2 million foreclosures between
2007 and 2011 and completed at least 4 million foreclosures
during this time (Blomquist 2012).
Consequently, the Family Stress Model informs the first
part of our conceptual model (Fig. 1). We hypothesize that
wives and husbands who report employment and/or housing
problems resulting from the recession will report greater
economic pressure. Further, economic pressure will be indirectly associated with measures of marital quality such as
satisfaction and divorce proneness. Economic pressure will
mediate the association between the recession-related stressors and measures of marital quality.
Integrating the Family Stress and FAAR Models
Although the Family Stress Model explains the process
through which financial stressors decrease marital quality,
it does not explain how moderating factors might protect
couples’ relationships from economic pressure (Conger et al.
1999, is an exception). We reframe some of the concepts
from the Family Stress Model within the FAAR model (Patterson 2002) to examine marital factors that might promote
resilience. We do not discuss all of the aspects of the FAAR
model; we present the aspects of the model that are most
relevant to the present study and, importantly, those aspects
that we can test, given our data.
Like the Family Stress Model, the concept of stressors
is central to the FAAR model, but the FAAR model calls
stressors “demands.” The FAAR model proposes that
demands or stressors prompt individuals and families to use
their capabilities/resources to either regain homeostasis or
create a new one (Patterson 2002). The objective financial
stressors in the Family Stress Model are the demands in the
FAAR model.
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Wives’ Moderators
(Modeled as Actor and Partner Effect)
Own Commitment
Own Relationship Maintenance
Behaviors toward Spouse

Wives’ Independent Variables
(Modeled as Actor Effect Only)
Own Employment Problems
Reported Housing Problems
Reported Savings and Debt
Reported Control Covariates

Wives’ Economic
Pressure
Couple-level Independent Variables
Total Family Income
Number of Children in the Home
Marital Duration
Husbands’ Economic
Pressure
Husbands’ Independent Variables
(Modeled as Actor Effect Only)
Own Employment Problems
Reported Housing Problems
Reported Savings and Debt
Reported Control Covariates

W Marital
Satisfaction
W Divorce
Proneness

H Marital
Satisfaction
H Divorce
Proneness

Husbands’ Moderators
(Modeled as Actor and Partner Effect)
Own Commitment
Own Relationship Maintenance
Behaviors toward Spouse

Fig. 1  Conceptual and analytic mediator/moderator model. (Note All of the participant’s own independent variables were controlled for in the
marital quality dependent variables.)

In the FAAR model, demands do not completely capture
how individuals or families experience stress. In the model,
the concept of “meanings” is important both prior to and
following a crisis. Meanings are individuals’ and families’
subjective perceptions of both the demands they face and the
capabilities that they possess to meet those demands (Patterson 2002). Families may, for example, reframe the meaning
of their demands to adapt to a new situation and regain their
family equilibrium.
Because economic pressure is a subjective view, then, the
FAAR model might consider it to be a meaning. The crucial
insight from the FAAR model regarding economic pressure,
then, is that the more economic pressure spouses report,
the more they have defined their financial circumstances as
problematic for their family. The FAAR model might assert
that this accounts for some of the strength of economic pressure to effect marital distress.
Marital Capabilities and Resilience
The FAAR model makes provisions for individuals and
families to use their capabilities to directly adjust and adapt
to life’s demands. According to the model, resilient couples use their capabilities and resources to experience economic pressure without experiencing substantial declines in
marital quality. Researchers have identified characteristics
of couple resilience during economic pressure (Archuleta

et al. 2011; Conger et al. 1999; Ellison et al. 2011; Liker
and Elder 1983). Ellison et al. (2011), for example, observed
that higher levels of religious marital sanctification were
associated with lower levels of divorce proneness during
financial strain. The authors of these studies speculated that
the resilience factors allowed spouses to compartmentalize
feelings of economic pressure to prevent it from spreading
additional types negative affect (e.g., anxiety, hostility) to
the relationship.
We study two additional concepts, dedication commitment and relationship maintenance behaviors, that may
moderate the association between economic pressure and
marital quality, but that research has not previously tested.
We test these two concepts because of their relatively strong
association with marital quality (e.g., Dainton 2000; Dew
and Wilcox 2013; Stanley et al. 2010). Furthermore, commitment and relationship maintenance behaviors are accessible to all married couples. In previous studies, some of the
moderating factors, like non-reactive personalities or religious marital sanctification, are not necessarily applicable
to everyone. Any married individual, however, can adopt
commitment attitudes and practice relationship maintenance
behaviors on a regular basis.
Scholars have defined commitment as “the intention to
maintain a relationship over time” (Stanley et al. 2010, p.
243). Two forms of commitment have received attention
in the literature: dedication commitment and constraint
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commitment (Stanley and Markman 1992). We focus on
dedication commitment because our data do not contain
constraint commitment measures. We did not want to use
proxies (e.g., shared number of friends, number of children
in the home) that may or may not validly measure constraint
commitment. Dedication commitment reflects a “desire of
an individual to maintain or improve the quality of his or her
relationship for the joint benefit of the participants” (Stanley
and Markman 1992, p. 595).
Dedication commitment could help individuals avoid
the declines in marital quality during economic pressure.
Because it involves a pro-relationship mindset, dedication
commitment may enable marital partners to look beyond
current feelings of economic pressure and focus on longterm marital outcomes (Stanley et al. 2010).
One spouse’s commitment might also help the other
spouse during feelings of economic pressure. Commitment
might work as a signaling mechanism that stabilizes the
other spouse’s marital quality during periods of economic
pressure. For example, husbands’ commitment might be
associated with lower levels of wives’ divorce proneness
or higher levels of wives’ marital satisfaction when wives
report economic pressure because the wives know that their
husbands are invested in the relationship.
For one’s commitment to act as a signal to his or her
spouse, the commitment may need to be demonstrated
through behaviors. Research has indicated that even though
dedication commitment is a long-term cognitive orientation
toward a relationship, it also promotes behaviors that nurture
relationships and help to fulfill the desire to stay together.
For example, a study by social psychologists showed that
commitment was positively associated with participants’
willingness to compromise with their partners over time
(Wieselquist et al. 1999). Thus, dedication commitment
might motivate partners to engage in positive relationship
behaviors that could stabilize or even enhance relationship
quality during economically difficult times (Stanley and
Markman 1992; Wilcox and Dew 2016).
Behaviors such as relationship compromise are known in
social psychology as relationship maintenance behaviors.
Individuals use these behaviors to maintain and strengthen
their intimate relationships (Stafford and Canary 1991).
They include such behavior as forgiving, talking about the
relationship itself, and offering assurances (Stafford 2011).
Not surprisingly, studies have shown that relationship maintenance behaviors are positively associated with relationship quality (Dainton 2000; Dew and Wilcox 2013; Stafford
2003).
When one spouse engages in relation maintenance behaviors, it may protect the other spouse’s marital quality during
economic pressure. One spouse’s relationship maintenance
behaviors signal that spouse’s intention to continue in the
relationship and may reduce marital distress or worries of
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divorce during times of economic pressure. Such behaviors
might also simply make the relationship more enjoyable
(Dew and Wilcox 2013; Stafford 2003). Receiving relationship maintenance behaviors from one’s spouse, then, may
reduce the association between economic pressure and marital quality.
Finally, participants’ own reports of relationship maintenance behaviors might also moderate the relationship
between economic pressure and declines in their own marital
quality. Previous research suggested that one’s own relationship maintenance behaviors were positively associated with
marital quality even when one’s spouse’s relationship maintenance behaviors were also in the same multivariate model
(Dew and Wilcox 2013). These findings suggest that one’s
own relationship maintenance behaviors may be associated
with relationship quality gains.
Actor‑Partner Interdependence Model
Because we suggest that participants’ commitment or relationship maintenance behaviors might moderate the relationship between economic pressure and marital quality either
for themselves or their spouses, and because our data were
dyadic, we used the Actor Partner Interdependence Model
(APIM, Kenny et al. 2006; Fig. 1) as an analytic framework.
The APIM tests actor effects (i.e., the association between a
participant’s own independent and dependent variables) and
partner effects (i.e., the association between a participant’s
independent variables and his or her spouse’s dependent
variables).
Contextual Issues
In addition to these hypotheses and variables, we controlled
for basic demographic covariates and couples’ financial situations. We controlled for basic demographic characteristics
(e.g., education, race) to help account for social structural
issues that might be conflated with economic pressure out
of the model. We also controlled for couples’ financial situations (i.e., income, assets, consumer debt) so that the association between economic pressure, the moderators, and
marital quality can be assessed net of the couples’ actual
financial positions.
Summary
To summarize, the Family Stress Theory suggests that financial problems can harm marriages (Conger et al. 1994), but
the FAAR model suggests that couples’ demands can be
tempered by their capabilities and the meanings they attribute to stressors (Patterson 2002). This study contributes to
the literature by testing whether relationship-specific capabilities, such as commitment and relationship maintenance
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behaviors, moderate the association between feelings of
economic pressure and marital quality. It also adds to the
literature by using nationally-representative dyadic data—
data qualities which none of the other studies of these associations have had.

Method
Data and Sample
Data for this research came from the Survey of Marital Generosity (SMG). The SMG was originally designed to measure a broad range of marital attitudes, behaviors, and outcome variables. It also included financial and demographic
questions. The SMG was intended to be a national sample of
heterosexual married couples with participants aged 18–45.
A survey research firm (Knowledge Networks) conducted
the SMG from late 2010 to early 2011. To gather the data for
the SMG, the firm invited participants from their preexisting
Knowledge Panel who were married and between the ages
of 18 and 45; spouses of the participants could be between
the ages of 18 and 55. The original Knowledge Panel was
nationally representative and obtained using random-digit
dialing and random-address-based sampling. By using random-address-based sampling, the survey included individuals without landline-based phone numbers and thus avoided
a common contributor to sampling bias.
All of the couples in the SMG were married. Participants
completed the survey over the internet. If participants did
not have an internet connection, Knowledge Networks provided the connection. A total of 4510 individuals from the
original Knowledge Panel were invited to participate in the
SMG, and 3455 completed the survey (1745 wives and 1705
husbands).
We utilized two inclusion criteria to determine which
SMG participants were eligible for the present study. First,
to be included in this study, SMG participants had to have a
spouse who also completed the survey. This was necessary
to conduct the analysis using the APIM model. Most SMG
participants (89%) had participating spouses. Second, both
spouses had to be between the ages of 18 and 45; these were
the only individuals with post-stratification weights. Utilizing these two criteria yielded a sample of 1368 wives and
1368 husbands.
We examined the differences between those included in
this study and those excluded by our criteria. Participants in
our study reported slightly higher marital satisfaction than
those who were excluded (r = .05, p < .05 for both wives and
husbands). None of the other variables regarding marriage
(e.g., divorce proneness, commitment, etc.) were significantly different between the two groups. Those included in
this study reported slightly lower savings levels (r = − .12,
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p < .001). Furthermore, Hispanic men were slightly more
likely to be eligible for this study (r = .06, p < .001) than
White, non-Hispanic men. Those with lower household
incomes (r = − .07, p < .01), though not more economic
pressure, were slightly more likely to be eligible for this
study. Finally, both wives (r = − .39, p < .001) and husbands
(r = − .52, p < .001) who were able to be in this study were
younger than those who were not. This last finding was not
surprising given that we could not accommodate those older
than 45 years old because they did not have post-stratification weights.
Measures
Dependent Variables
We used a marital satisfaction scale as one measure of marital quality. We created this scale by taking the mean of four
items that surveyed participants’ happiness in marriage.
These items pertained to love and affection, fairness, communication, and sex. For each of these items, participants
rated their level of happiness on a scale of 1 (Very Unhappy)
to 5 (Very Happy). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.88 for wives and
0.86 for husbands.
The second measure of marital quality was a single-item
variable of participants’ perceived divorce proneness. Participants rated the level of likelihood that they would divorce
on a scale of 1 (Very Low) to 11 (Very High). Because of the
heavy positive skew of this variable, we top-coded it at 4.
Independent and Moderator Variables
We used two variables to measure recession-related employment and housing problems. The employment question
asked, “Have you been unemployed, had your pay cut, or
had your work hours reduced since the recession began?”
The housing question asked, “Have you been through a foreclosure or had problems making mortgage payments since
the recession began?” Respondents answered “Yes” or “No”
to each question. We dummy-coded these variables.
Economic pressure was a moderator variable in our analyses (Fig. 1). We operationalized this construct using an item
that asked, “How often do you worry that your total family
income will not be enough to meet your family’s expenses
and bills?” Participants could respond from 1 (Never) to 5
(Almost all of the time). We centered this variable (and all
other moderator variables) around its mean prior to creating
interaction terms.
Reported relationship maintenance behaviors also functioned as a moderator variable. We measured these behaviors
using the mean of four items indicating how often participants engaged in small acts of kindness for their spouses,
expressed affection, expressed respect, and forgave their
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spouses. Participants rated the frequency with which they
engaged in those behaviors on a scale of 1 (Never) to 5
(Always). These items, while not nearly as numerous as the
items included in Stafford’s (2011) Relationship Maintenance Behavior Measure, capture some of the same dimensions within that measure. For this scale, Cronbach’s alpha
was 0.85 for wives and 0.84 for husbands. Factor analysis of
these items in previous studies has indicated that one factor
explains most of the variance in the items (Dew and Wilcox
2013).
We created the commitment variable by taking the mean
of four items from the personal dedication subscale of Stanley and Markman’s (1992) Commitment Inventory (e.g., “I
want this relationship to stay strong no matter what rough
times we encounter”). Participants rated their level of agreement with each item on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5
(Strongly Agree). For this scale, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.82
for wives and 0.83 for husbands.
We used two measures of financial wellbeing to examine
participants’ financial contexts: liquid savings and consumer
debt1. To measure liquid savings, we asked participants,
“What is the approximate total value of your savings, including things like savings accounts, money market shares, and
CD’s?” We measured consumer debt by asking, “How much
debt do you owe on credit card or charge accounts, installment loans, or bills that you’ve owed for over 2 months?
Do not include vehicle loans or home mortgage debt.” Both
items had a response scale of 1 (None) to 12 ($250,000 or
more). Given the wording of these items, we were not sure
whether participants reported individual-level or householdlevel savings and debt. Because of this problem, we included
the reports of savings and debt as actor, but not partner,
effects.
Finally, we included participants’ education, total household income, number of children in the home, marital duration, number of marriages, and race/ethnicity as control
covariates in all of the models. We measured education on
a scale of 1 (No Formal Education) to 14 (Professional or
Doctorate degree). Total household income2 was reported
on a scale of 1 (Less than $5,000) to 19 ($175,000 or more).
Participants reported the total number of children in the
home and their marital duration in years. These variables
were couple-level variables, and strong agreement was
reported between spouses (the correlations for these two
variables were at or near 1) so we simply used wives’ reports
of these variables in the models. Each participant reported
the number of times he or she had been married. Participants reported their race/ethnicity. From these responses, we
created three dichotomous variables: Black non-Hispanic,
1
2

These two variables were measured in US dollars.
This variable was also measured in US dollars.
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Hispanic, and Other; White, Non-Hispanic was the omitted
category.
Analysis
We used path analyses to test the model (Fig. 1). Path analyses allowed us to simultaneously test all of the pathways
specified in the model. Furthermore, not only did it allow
us to simultaneous test the mediation aspect of the model,
but we were also able to test the moderation aspect (i.e., we
were able to add the interaction terms to the model). Using
a structural model to simultaneously test multiple regression
pathways is the most common way of testing the Family
Stress Model (e.g., Conger et al. 1999).
We could not use structural equation modeling, which
essentially combines a structural model with a measurement model (conceptually equivalent to a factor analysis),
because some of the major variables (e.g., economic pressure, divorce proneness) and most of the control variables
were single-item measures. Scholars typically do not run
factor analysis with only single-item variables. And although
it is possible to specify measurement models with single
items, such a solution also requires that the researcher estimate, the percent of measurement error variance in each
single-item variable (Kline 2005). We did not believe that
it was advisable to estimate—or simply guess—the percent
of measurement error for the majority of the variables in
our model.
The path models assumed that the variables, especially
the dependent variables, were normally distributed. The
divorce proneness variable was heavily skewed. To ensure
that our findings were not influenced by this skewness,
we tested models using non-linear transformations of the
divorce proneness variable. The transformation that made
divorce proneness most closely approximate the normal distribution was to top-code it. Any score of divorce proneness
that exceeded four was set to four. The findings from this
top-coded analysis were similar to the findings using the
non-transformed variable. The few differences that arose
were primarily in the control-variable coefficients. The only
substantive difference was that wives’ relationship maintenance behaviors predicted wives’ and husbands’ divorce
proneness in the top-coded models, but not in the models
with the non-transformed divorce proneness. Furthermore,
the interaction between wives’ economic pressure and husbands’ commitment was statistically related with divorce
proneness in the top-coded model, but the interaction only
attained near-significance in the non-transformed divorce
proneness models. We present the top-coded models given
that they more closely meet the analytic assumptions of our
models.
We used the provided post-stratification weights to
make our findings representative. We were confronted
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics

Wives

Marital satisfaction
Divorce proneness
Economic pressure
Commitment
Relationship maintenance behaviors
Consumer debt
Savings
Education
Household incomea
Number of children in h omea
Marital durationa
Number of marriages
Black, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other
a

Husbands

M or %

StD

Range

M or %

StD

Range

3.81
2.03
3.04
4.24
3.96
3.71
4.74
10.65
12.83
1.68
9.87
1.14
6.4%
15.6%
9.0%

0.92
1.21
1.21
0.71
0.75
2.37
3.15
1.90
3.77
1.35
6.27
0.57

1–5
1–4
1–5
1–5
1–5
1–12
1–12
3–14
1–19
0–11
0–26
1–20

3.85
2.00
2.95
4.25
3.89
3.67
4.94
10.55
12.83
1.68
9.87
1.18
7.8%
16.5%
8.0%

0.90
1.20
1.24
0.70
0.78
2.35
3.21
1.90
3.77
1.35
6.27
1.05

1–5
1–4
1–5
1–5
1–5
1–12
1–12
1–14
1–19
0–11
0–26
1–20

These were couple-level variables

with the dilemma that weights were created at an individual level, but that our analysis was conducted on a
dyadic level. We averaged wives’ and husbands’ weights
to address this issue (the correlation between wives’ and
husbands’ weights was r = .63). An analysis showed that
the results using the averaged weights were not very different from models using either the wives’ or the husbands’ post-stratification weights. We also examined
whether using the weights changed the results. Most
of the results were similar, though some of the control
covariate coefficients changed significance. Like the topcoded model, the interaction between wives’ economic
pressure and husbands’ commitment was only statistically
related with divorce proneness in the weighted models.
Missing data were the final analytical issue. The variables had between 0–2% of the cases missing, with a
cumulative total of 5.3% of the sample (n = 73) missing
at least one of the variables we intended to use in the
models. We used full information maximum likelihood
(FIML) techniques to obviate the problem of missing
data. FIML yields estimates that are similar to multiple
imputation (Johnson and Young 2011). We compared the
FIML results to those obtained by using listwise deletion.
Given the large sample size and the small number of missing variables, the findings from the FIML analysis were
understandably the same as the findings obtained by using
listwise deletion, with the exception of a few minor differences in the control covariate coefficients. We present
the FIML findings.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. On average, participants were satisfied in their marriages (M = 3.81 for wives,
M = 3.85 for husbands) and had low to moderate levels of
divorce proneness (M = 2.03 for wives, M = 2.00 for husbands). The mean of economic pressure was approximately
at the scale’s midpoint (M = 3.04 for wives, M = 2.95 for husbands). Participants reported a relatively high average level
of relationship maintenance behavior (M = 3.96 for wives,
M = 3.89 for husbands) toward spouses and a high average
level of commitment (M = 4.24 for wives and 4.25 for husbands). Mean education (M = 10.65 for wives, M = 10.55
for husbands) corresponded to a level between having had
some college but no degree and having an associate’s degree.
Finally, mean household income (M = 12.83) corresponded
to a level between the $50,000-to-$59,999 level (i.e., an
income score of 12) and the $60,000-to-$74,999 level (i.e.,
an income score of 13). The descriptive statistics for the
additional control covariates are shown in Table 1.
We checked the demographic characteristics against data
from the General Social Survey (GSS) to examine the representativeness of our sample. We restricted this analysis
to married, 18- to 45-year-old individuals from the 2010
GSS to match our study. The participants in our study had
the same education levels as those in the GSS. The average
income for the participants in the GSS was $60,034. Our
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Table 2  Path Model estimates of the association between financial wellbeing, commitment, relationship maintenance behaviors, economic pressure and marital satisfaction

Intercept
Participant reports recession-related employment problemsa
Participant reports recession-related housing problemsa
W Economic pressurea
W Marital commitment
W Rel. maintenance behaviors
H Economic p ressurea
H Marital commitment
H Rel. maintenance behaviors
Participant reported consumer debta
Participant reported liquid s avingsa
Participant educationa
Total family incomeb
Number of children in h omeb
Marital durationb
Participant number of m
 arriagesa
Participant Black, non-Hispanica
Participant Hispanica
Participant other race/ethnicity a
Participant economic pressure * participant commitment
Participant economic pressure * participant rel. maint. beh
Participant economic pressure * spouse commitment
Participant economic pressure * spouse rel. maint. beh
R2

Wives’ Economic
Pressure

Husbands’ Economic Pressure

Wives’ Marital
Satisfaction

Husbands’ Marital Satisfaction

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

0.26
0.20**
0.32*
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.14***
− 0.10***
0.02
− 0.05***
0.05*
0.01
0.01
− 0.06
− 0.13
0.07
–
–
–
–
0.28

0.29
0.07
0.12
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.15
0.10
0.10
–
–
–
–

0.82**
0.22**
0.29*
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.13***
− 0.07***
− 0.03
− 0.06***
0.05
0.01
− 0.01
0.46***
− 0.22*
0.03
–
–
–
–
0.26

0.28
0.07
0.12
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.16
0.11
0.14
–
–
–
–

4.01***
− 0.10*
− 0.16
− 0.09***
0.48***
0.28***
–
0.04
0.28***
− 0.03**
− 0.01
− 0.01
− 0.01
0.02
0.01
− 0.05
0.08
0.06
− 0.08
0.01
− 0.03
− 0.03
0.09**
0.53

0.14
0.05
0.09
0.02
0.05
0.04
–
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.11
0.06
0.09
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.03

4.10***
0.03
− 0.09
–
0.11*
0.29***
− 0.10***
0.39***
0.25***
− 0.02*
0.02*
− 0.02
− 0.01
0.01
− 0.01
0.01
0.11
0.23***
0.13
0.01
0.01
− 0.02
0.05
0.48

0.18
0.05
0.08
–
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.03

CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.03, SRMR = .01
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
a

b

Only actor effects were modeled with these variables.
These were couple-level variables

income scale was not able to be that precise, but the mean
of 12.83 on our income scale would likely be near $60,000.
The number of children in the GSS was 1.70 for men and
1.89 for women. In our study it was 1.68. The GSS did not
measure the current marital duration, so we were unable
to compare our sample’s marital duration against the GSS.
Finally, we compared the race/ethnicity percentages in this
study to the GSS. In our study, 6.4% of the wives identified
as Black, non-Hispanic, 15.6% identified as Hispanic, and
9% identified as being in the other race/ethnic category. The
GSS had 9.1, 16.7, and 6.6% of the wives in those same
categories, respectively. Among the men in our study, 7.8%
identified as Black, non-Hispanic, 16.5% identified as Hispanic, and 8.0% identified themselves as being in the other
race/ethnic category. The GSS had 4.1, 16.3, and 2.7% in
those same categories, respectively. Thus, after using the
post-stratification weights, our sample is close to the GSS
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sample, with the exception of some slight differences in race/
ethnicity composition.
Path Model Results
Marital Satisfaction
Table 2 shows the estimates from the path models regarding both economic pressure and marital satisfaction. Overall
model fit was strong. The CFI was 0.96. The RMSEA was
0.03, and the SRMR was 0.01.
Because we presumed that economic pressure predicted
marital satisfaction as a mediator variable in the path
models, we discuss it first. The first and second columns
in Table 2 show the associations between the independent
variables and wives’ and husbands’ reports of economic
pressure (respectively). As expected, wives’ reports of

J Fam Econ Iss (2018) 39:191–204

199

Fig. 2  Wives’ predicted marital
satisfaction based on the wives’
economic pressure by husbands’
relationship maintenance behavior interaction

recession-related employment problems (b = 0.20, p < .01)
and housing problems (b = 0.32, p < .05) were positively
associated with their reports of economic pressure. Wives’
reports of consumer debt were positively associated with
economic pressure (b = 0.13, p < .001), while liquid savings (b = − 0.10, p < .001) and income (b = − 0.05, p < .001)
were negatively associated. None of the other independent
variables were associated with wives’ reports of economic
pressure. The model explained 28% of the variance in wives’
reports of economic pressure.
The model for husbands’ reports of economic pressure
were similar. Husbands’ reports of their own recessionrelated employment (b = 0.22, p < .01) and housing problems (b = 0.29, p < .05) were positively associated with
their reports of economic pressure. Like wives, husbands’
reported consumer debt was positively related to reports of
economic pressure (b = 0.13, p < .001), but liquid savings
(b = − 0.07, p < .001) and income (b = − 0.06, p < .001) were
negatively related. Black, non-Hispanic husbands reported
greater economic pressure than White, non-Hispanic husbands (b = 0.46, p < .001), while Hispanic husbands reported
less pressure (b = − 0.22, p < .05). The model explained 26%
of the variance in husbands’ reports of economic pressure.
Table 2 also shows the estimates for wives’ and husbands’ marital satisfaction. Contrary to the mediation we
had predicted, wives’ reports of recession-related employment problems were directly and negatively associated with
their reports of marital satisfaction (b = − 0.10, p < .05).
Wives’ reports of economic pressure were negatively associated with their reports of marital satisfaction (b = − 0.09,
p < .001). Wives’ marital commitment (b = 0.48, p < .001),
their reports of relationship maintenance behaviors toward
their husbands (b = 0.28, p < .001), and husbands’ reports
of relationship maintenance behaviors toward their wives
(b = 0.28, p < .001) were positively associated with wives’

reports of marital satisfaction. Wives’ consumer debt
was negatively associated with their marital satisfaction
(b = − 0.03, p < .01).
Finally, an interaction emerged between wives’ economic
pressure and husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors
(b = 0.09, p < .01). We graphed predicted levels of wives’
marital satisfaction by entering ± 1 standard deviation values
for wives’ economic pressure and ± 1 husbands’ relationship
maintenance behavior values. This resulted in four different levels of wives’ predicted marital satisfaction (Fig. 2).
Among the group of wives whose husbands reported higher
levels of relationship maintenance behaviors (+ 1 standard
deviation), the difference between the wives with low economic pressure (− 1 standard deviation) and high economic
pressure (+ 1 standard deviation) was only 0.05 of a point.
In contrast, among the group of wives with husbands who
reported less relationship maintenance behavior (− 1 standard deviation), the marital satisfaction difference between
the low economic pressure wives (− 1 standard deviation)
and the high economic pressure wives (+ 1 standard deviation) was about 0.4 of a point. The overall model explained
53% of wives’ marital satisfaction.
The results for husbands’ reported marital satisfaction
are also found in Table 2. Husbands’ reported economic
pressure was negatively associated with their reports of
marital satisfaction (b = − 0.10, p < .001), but neither of the
recession-related stressors was associated with marital quality when economic pressure was in the model. Husbands’
own reported marital commitment (b = 0.39, p < .001) and
relationship maintenance behaviors (b = 0.25, p < .001) were
positively associated with their marital satisfaction. Like the
wives’ model, some partner effects emerged as well. Wives’
reported marital commitment (b = 0.11, p < .05) and relationship maintenance behaviors (b = 0.29, p < .001) were
also associated with husbands’ reported marital satisfaction.
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Table 3  Path Model estimates of the association between financial wellbeing, commitment, relationship maintenance behaviors, economic pressure and divorce proneness

Intercept
Participant reports recession-related employment problemsa
Participant reports recession-related housing problemsa
W Economic pressure
W Marital commitment
W Rel. maintenance behaviors
H Economic pressure
H Marital commitment
H Rel. maintenance behaviors
Participant reported consumer debta
Participant reported liquid s avingsa
Participant educationa
Total family incomeb
Number of children in h omeb
Marital durationb
Participant number of m
 arriagesa
Participant Black, non-Hispanica
Participant Hispanica
Participant other race/ethnicity a
Participant economic pressure * participant commitment
Participant economic pressure * participant rel. maint. beh
Participant economic pressure * spouse commitment
Participant economic pressure * spouse rel. maint. beh
R2

Wives’ economic
pressure

Husbands’ economic pressure

Wives’ divorce
proneness

Husbands’
divorce proneness

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

0.27
0.20**
0.32*
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.14***
− 0.10***
0.02
− 0.06***
0.05*
0.01
0.01
− 0.06
− 0.13
0.07
–
–
–
–
0.28

0.29
0.07
0.12
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.15
0.10
0.10
–
–
–
–

0.82**
0.21**
0.29*
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.13***
− 0.07***
− 0.03
− 0.06***
0.05
0.01
− 0.01
0.46***
− 0.22*
0.04
–
–
–
–
0.27

0.28
0.07
0.12
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.16
0.11
0.14
–
–
–
–

1.97***
0.10
0.27**
0.06*
− 0.76***
− 0.18***
–
− 0.22***
− 0.22***
0.02
− 0.01
0.02
− 0.01
− 0.04
− 0.01
− 0.01
0.51***
0.04
− 0.01
0.01
− 0.05
0.14**
− 0.10*
0.49

0.23
0.06
0.10
0.03
0.06
0.05
–
0.06
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.13
0.10
0.08
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04

2.27***
0.10
0.16
–
− 0.24***
− 0.20***
0.09**
− 0.65***
− 0.20***
0.01
− 0.02
− 0.01
− 0.01
− 0.06*
− 0.01
− 0.02
0.31**
− 0.02
− 0.10
− 0.07
− 0.05
0.06
− 0.06
0.41

0.22
0.06
0.11
–
0.07
0.06
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.06
0.04
0.06
0.05

CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.03, SRMR = .01
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
a

b

Only actor effects were controlled for with these variables
These were couple-level variables

Husbands’ consumer debt was negatively associated with
marital satisfaction (b = − 0.02, p < .05) while their liquid
savings were positively associated (b = 0.02, p < .05). Hispanic husbands were more satisfied with their marriages
than White, non-Hispanic husbands (b = 0.23, p < .001). We
note that none of the interactions were significant predictors
of husbands’ marital satisfaction. The model explained 48%
of the variance in husbands’ reported marital satisfaction.
Table 3 shows the path model results for divorce proneness. Model fit for this model was also strong. The CFI was
0.95, the RMSEA was 0.03, and the SRMR was 0.01.
The association between the independent variables and
economic pressure shown in Table 3 were nearly identical
to the results in Table 2, as would be expected, so we do
not discuss them. Wives’ reports of housing-related problems were positively associated with divorce proneness
(b = 0.27, p < .01), even though economic pressure was also
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in the model. In fact, although wives’ reports of economic
pressure were positively associated with divorce proneness,
the coefficient was small (b = 0.06, p < .05). Wives’ reports
of their own marital commitment (b = − 0.76, p < .001) and
relationship maintenance behaviors (b = − 0.18, p < .001)
and husbands’ reports of their own marital commitment
(b = − 0.22, p < .001) and relationship maintenance behaviors (b = − 0.22, p < .001) were all negatively associated with
wives’ reports of divorce proneness. Black, non-Hispanic
wives reported more divorce proneness (b = 0.51, p < .001)
than White, non-Hispanic wives.
Two interaction terms were associated with the wives’
reports of divorce proneness. The first was a negative interaction between wives’ economic pressure and husbands’
relationship maintenance behavior (b = − 0.10, p < .05).
Graphing the predicted wives’ divorce proneness (Fig. 3)
suggests that higher levels of husbands’ relationship
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Fig. 3  Wives’ predicted divorce
proneness based on the wives’
economic pressure by husbands’
relationship maintenance behavior interaction

Fig. 4  Wives’ predicted divorce
proneness based on the wives’
economic pressure by husbands’
commitment interaction

maintenance behaviors (+ 1 standard deviation) were associated with divorce proneness levels that were equal whether
wives’ reported low (− 1 standard deviation) or high (+ 1
standard deviation) economic pressure. Lower levels of
husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors (− 1 standard deviation) were associated with higher levels of divorce
proneness, though, when wives reported greater economic
pressure (+ 1 standard deviation) than when wives reported
less economic pressure (− 1 standard deviation).
The second interaction term was a positive interaction
between wife economic pressure and husband commitment
(b = 0.14, p < .01). Graphing the predicted levels of divorce
proneness (Fig. 4) showed that wives reporting lower levels
of economic pressure (− 1 standard deviation) reported different levels of divorce proneness depending on their husbands’ reported commitment (the difference was about 0.5
points and favored those with more committed husbands).

However, among wives reporting high levels of economic
pressure (+ 1 standard deviation), the differences were not
large in practical terms. The overall model explained 49% of
the variance in wives’ reports of divorce proneness.
In the husbands’ models, husbands’ economic pressure
was positively associated with their reports of divorce proneness (b = 0.09, p < .01). As in the wives’ models, husbands’
commitment (b = − 0.65, p < .001) and relationship maintenance behaviors (b = − 0.20, p < .001) and wives’ commitment (b = − 0.24, p < .001) and relationship maintenance
behaviors (b = − 0.20, p < .001) were negatively associated
with husbands’ reports of divorce proneness. Black, nonHispanic husbands reported higher levels of divorce proneness than White, non-Hispanic husbands (b = 0.31, p < .01).
None of the interaction terms were associated with husbands’ divorce proneness. The model explained 41% of the
variance in husbands’ reports of divorce proneness.
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Discussion
We employed the Family Stress Model of Economic Pressure and Marital Distress (Conger et al. 1994) to examine
whether commitment and relationship maintenance behaviors acted as marital resilience factors when participants
reported feelings of economic pressure. Using a contemporary national sample of married couples, we found that
employment- and housing-related problems during the
2007–2009 Recession were indirectly and directly related
to the marital outcome variables. Furthermore, economic
pressure was negatively associated with marital satisfaction
and positively associated with divorce proneness. The only
moderators that were significant were an interaction between
wives’ economic pressure and husbands’ relationship maintenance behavior and an interaction between wives’ economic pressure and husbands’ commitment.
Husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors moderated the association between wives’ economic pressure and
wives’ marital quality (both satisfaction and divorce proneness). We were not able to directly test the mechanisms in
these relationships, but we do offer suggestions of possible mechanisms. One possible explanation for this finding
is that husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors help
to reduce wives’ anxieties about economic pressure, thus
helping maintain marital quality. Having the support of
one’s spouse may reduce some of the negative affect that
frequently accompanies economic pressure (Conger et al.
1999).
However, relationship maintenance behaviors may also
act as a visible signal of husbands’ commitment to continuing the relationship. We had hypothesized that spouses who
show that they are willing to invest in their marriage by
serving their spouse may have better marriages despite economic pressure. Husbands who evidence their commitment
by behaving in ways that sustain their relationship may help
reduce their wives’ anxiety about the status of the relationship—particularly when there are other problems such as
financial issues.
Finally, the association may have resulted from simply meeting relationship expectations. Married individuals desire to receive relationship maintenance behaviors
(Dainton 2000). Figures 2 and 3 suggest marital stability
for wives whose husbands more frequently engage in relationship maintenance behaviors regardless of levels of economic pressure. These figures, then, may suggest that the
“action of the story” may be occurring among the wives
who received fewer relationship maintenance behaviors from
their husbands. Even when they faced less economic pressure, these wives were less happy and more divorce-prone
than their counterparts whose husbands engaged in more
relationship maintenance behaviors. Adding economic pressure may have exacerbated the fact that these women were
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not realizing their relationship expectations, which may then
decrease marital quality. Again, all three of these potential
mechanisms need investigation before we can definitively
settle on any of them as explanations.
The commitment finding also needs explanation. Contrary to our hypotheses, husbands’ commitment was only
associated with lower levels of wives’ divorce proneness
under conditions of lower levels of economic pressure. At
higher levels of economic pressure, husbands’ commitment was not associated with better levels of wives’ divorce
proneness. When wives face economic pressure, commitment (i.e., an attitude) might not be adequate to maintain stability; wives may need the actual relationship maintenance
behaviors that motivate commitment.
The fact that only husbands’ commitment and relationship maintenance behaviors served as moderators was
unexpected. Of the four past investigations of moderators
of economic pressure, gender differences were found in only
one. Liker and Elder (1983) found that husbands who experienced income loss and had unstable personalities during the
Great Depression reported greater marital conflict relative
to husbands who experienced income loss but who had stable personalities. Liker and Elder suggested that the differences stemmed from the gendered provider role norms of the
1930s. Our data, which were contemporary, showed that the
main effects of economic pressure on marital quality were
the same for husbands and wives. Thus, it is unlikely provider role norms were responsible for the gender differences.
We can only offer speculation as to the reasons for these
gender differences. Gender differences in the meanings of
relationship maintenance behaviors may exist. In general,
women use relationship maintenance behaviors more than
men (Dainton and Stafford 1993). Furthermore, gendered
family norms still place the onus of “emotion work,” a
construct implying behaviors similar to relationship maintenance behaviors, on women (Erickson 1993, 2005). However, husbands’ performance of emotion work has demonstrated a significant relationship with wives’ reports of their
relationship quality (Erickson 1993). Thus, high levels of
husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors may have had
an association with wives’ marital quality because husbands
performed relationship maintenance behaviors less often or
because it was less normative. When wives felt high levels of
economic pressure, but husbands engaged in high levels of
relationship maintenance behavior, wives may have appreciated their husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors
even more. These speculations await further research.
This study has limitations. First, the data were cross-sectional. This shortcoming limited our ability to specify the
directions of relationships, and we are not able to imply anything about causality. Thus, we have tried to be circumspect
as we described and discussed the findings. Future research
might use longitudinal data to see if interactions between
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economic pressure and commitment or relationship maintenance behaviors would predict changes in marital quality.
Second, we used self-reported data in this study. Participants may have reported higher levels of certain variables
(e.g., marital quality, commitment) due to social desirability.
Unfortunately, we were not able to test how social desirability may have influenced the findings. This limitation is
somewhat mitigated by our use of multiple reporters and the
APIM framework. That is, in some cases, husbands’ reports
of relationship maintenance behaviors served as moderators
of the relationship between wives’ economic pressure and
marital quality. It would be more difficult for social desirability to operate across multiple reporters and partner effects.
Further, many of our variables were single-item measures
(e.g., economic pressure, divorce proneness). We did not
have the space in the survey to employ multiple items in
some measures. We recognize the measurement error issue
that stems from using single-item variables. Greater reliability might have resulted in more statistically significant
findings—especially in the interaction terms. We argue,
however, that because many of the single-item measures
conformed with theoretical expectations (e.g., the stressors
were positively associated with economic pressure, economic pressure was positively associated with the marital
outcome variables), that the single-item measures were sufficiently reliable and valid. We submit that given the reliability issue, our findings might have actually been lower-bound
estimates of the true relationships in our model.
Finally, we should qualify these conclusions by noting
that the participants’ data were collected soon after the
2007–2009 Recession. Consequently, these findings may
be most relevant for or applicable to couples during macroeconomic shocks. The protective nature of husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors might apply to the financial stressors of the 2007–2009 recession specifically, or to
macro-economic shocks more generally. This qualification
needs future research.

Conclusion
Many married couples, if not most, will experience financial
difficulties during their relationship. This study adds to four
other studies that have demonstrated individual and marital
factors that can help couples maintain their quality during
these financial difficulties. It is unfortunate that so few studies have examined a question that influences many families.
This study specifically showed that husbands’ relationship
maintenance behaviors were especially helpful in keeping
wives’ marital quality stable in spite of wives’ feelings of
economic pressure.
The fact that husbands’ relationship maintenance behaviors (i.e., small giving behaviors) help their wives maintain
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stable marital quality when they feel economic pressure may
seem somewhat prosaic or pedestrian. Rather than reducing the importance of these findings, however, the prosaic
nature of relationship maintenance behaviors is actually a
strength. Relationship maintenance behaviors are marital
behaviors that any spouse can cultivate. It does not matter
whether a spouse has high or low socio-economic status or
whether they have been married a long or short time, for
example. They can still practice these simple behaviors of
showing respect and appreciation toward their spouse. These
behaviors are simple and, in their application, couple specific. Thus, any spouse can actively engage in these positive
behaviors such that when an economic difficulty does occur,
they can protect their relationship quality.
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